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COUNCIL AND COMMISSION
FIFTEENTH REPORT
ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE MONETARY COMMITTEE
FOREWORD
The purpose of this report is to give a brief account of the activities of the Monetary
Committee during 1973.
During this year, the Committee held 17 sessions and the working parties drawn from
its own members or set up at its initiative met on occasions. A list of members as at
31 December 1973 is annexed.
As a result of the accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom to the
European Communities on 1 January 1973, the delegates from these countries became
full members  of  the Monetary Committee.
INTRODUCTION
In 1973 the Community encountered serious
difficulties in its efforts to harmonize economic
policies mainly on account of severe disruptions on
the foreign exchange markets and the consequences
of persistent inflation in the world, particularly in
the Community.
The pattern of exchange rate relationships between
the majority of the industrialized countries changed
drastically. However, developments on the foreign
exchange markets remained subject to many factOrs
of uncertainty, due to the oil crisis at the end of the
year.
In addition, the pace of inflation accelerated further
throughout the Community, despite a significant
improvement in the terms of trade in some member
countries resulting from modifications of exchange
rate relationships, the spectacular fall in the external
CHAPTER I
deficit of the United States and the restrictive
measures instituted by almost all the national
authorities. Although it was possible in 1973 to
make progress towards the goal of economic and
monetary union existing and newly created
monetary and economic machinery worked under
increasingly difficult conditions.
The first chapter reviews events on the foreign
exchange markets, and the second chapter gives an
account of the institutional progress towards the
establishment of economic and monetary union, and
the policy measures introduced to combat inflation.
The third chapter is devoted to a review of the
economic and financial trend in the Community, and
the fourth summarizes the Committee s activities in
the monetary field, both in a Community and an
international context.
THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKETS IN 1973
1. In 1973 the persistent instability of the
international monetary system led to erratic
movements on the foreign exchange markets.
Speculative, monetary, economic and even politicalNo C 123/2 Official Journal of the European Communities 14. 10.
factors forced many countries to take measures of
exchange rate policy, so that in the course of the year
a completely new pattern of exchange rates evolved
as the dollar, the pound, the lira, the yen and the
Swiss franc were allowed to float independently and
at the same time six Community currencies floated
jointly in relation to all other currencies. In most
countries these measures were accompanied by new
restrictions on the international movement of capital.
All these measures, together with the improvement in
the external position of the United States, which
became apparent from the beginning of the autumn
and resulted in a gradual return of confidence in the
dollar, restored some quiet to most foreign exchange
markets in the closing months of 1973.
2. The institution of a two-tier exchange market
in Italy to put a brake on the outflow of capital (22
January 1973) and the decision by the Swiss
authorities to cease intervening on the foreign
exchange market so as to discourage the inflow of
foreign capital (23 January 1973) marked the
beginning of one of the largest waves of speculation
that the international monetary system has ever
known. The latent lack of confidence in
international monetary relations, particularly in the
dollar, provoked a flood of capital to most of the
Community countries especially Germany, and
Japan. Administrative measures to control capital
movements, such as those adopted by Germany on 5
February, proved ineffective against the highly
speculative nature of these flows, the result being
that between 1 and  February over $ 10000
million were converted into other currencies. This
caused most industrialized countries, including all
Community countries to close their foreign
exchange markets. After a series of consultations and
bilateral and multilateral conferences, of which the
main result was a decision to devalue the dollar by
100/0, taken on 12 February by the United States
Government (1), all the foreign exchange markets
reopened on 14 February. Earlier, on 13 February,
Italy had decided to allow the commercial lira, like
the financial lira, to float while continuing to
operate the two-tier exchange market. As with the
United Kingdom in June 1972, Italy thus ceased to
participate in the agreement on the narrowing of
margins between EEC currencies. Finally, on 
February Japan decided to allow its currency to
float. These last two measures led to a gradual
depreciation of the commercial lira and 
appreciation of the yen on the foreign exchange
markets.
) The devaluation of the US dollar, which raised the
official price of gold from $ 38 to $ 42'22 per ounce
of fine gold, was officially proposed to the IMF
on 18 October 1973 and was approved the same day.
3. But the foreign exchange markets were only
granted a brief respite. Lack of confidence in the
new pattern of exchange rates quickly reappeared
and again gave rise to large-scale movements of
capital. As a consequence, on 1 March several
countries which had continued to maintain their
exchange rates within fixed limits once again
experienced an enormous inflow of capital. Germany
was the main victim: in one day alone it absorbed
the record amount of  2 800 million. This
situation led to many of the industrialized countries
closing their foreign exchange markets on 1 or 2
March.
After several conferences between the Community
countries at first, and then between a larger number
of countries (the enlarged Group of Ten), this crisis
was resolved by the decision of the six Member
States of the EEC (2 to adapt the existing
Community exchange rate scheme, maintaining the
2'25 % spread between the respective currencies (the
snake ) but ceasing to intervene to maintain fixed
margins against the dollar (the 'tunnel' ). These
Council Decisions of 11 and 12 March, with which
Norway and Sweden associated themselves on 14 '
March, came into force with the reopening of the
exchange markets on 19 March. The same day
Germany revalued the DM by 30/0. Further, several
Community countries tightened the measures they
had taken to ward off inflows of capital.
4. The joint float of several Community
currencies and the accompanying measures taken by
certain participating countries initially brought an
easing of the international situation. Exchange rate
movements within the Community bloc were fairly
orderly, but the snake gradually left the old tunnel
in that the currencies of the participating countries
appreciated against the dollar.
Towards the end of June, the monetary climate
abruptly deteriorated again. The immediate cause of
this crisis, which was much less serious than that of
spring 1973, was again the US dollar, which suffered
a large fall in its rate, resulting from massive capital
outflows. Demand centred mainly on the DM. This
situation obliged the German monetary authorities
and those of other countries participating in the
joint float to intervene massively in German marks
and led to . an inflow of unwanted liquidity into
Germany. For this reason the German Government,
after consulting with its EEC partners, decided to
) Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, the Nether-
lands and Luxembourg. The United Kingdom, Ireland
and Italy continued to allow their currencies to float
independently (d. para. 9).14. 10. 74 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 123/3
revalue the DM by 5'5 % with effect from 29 June
while maintaining the 2'25 % margin of fluctuation
in relation to other currencies in the 'snake , based
on the new intra-Community parities deriving from
this revaluation.
5. At the beginning of July, the dollar rate fell to
level about 15 % lower than its nominal parity
against the currencies within the Community snake.
After a meeting of the governors of the principal
central banks at the Bank for International
Settlements on 8 July 1973, concerted action by the
US monetary authorities and certain central banks
helped to halt the depreciation of the dollar and
even to initiate a reverse movement. The action took
the form of intervention to support the dollar and of
improved harmonization of interest rate policies at
the international level, particularly on the part of the
United States.
6. After a 5 % revaluation of the Dutch florin on
17 September, which was justified by the strength of
the Dutch balance of payments - and which was also
part of a programme intended to control domestic
inflation, a sense of uncertainty once again
developed 111 the' foreign exchange markets.
Speculation was particularly directed towards the
French and Belgian currencies, in the expectation of
a possible revaluation of the Belgian franc and a
possible devaluation of the French franc. However,
the markets quickly returned to normal after the
monetary authorities concerned had intervened
massively and had, in particular, adapted their
interest rate structure.
7. The beginning of November saw a major
reversal in the situation on the international exchange
markets. News of the extremely favourable US trade
figures for September confirming a trend that had
already been discernible, brought about 
considerable improvement in the position of the
dollar. This movement received additional impetus
from the oil crisis, since the feeling on the markets
was clearly that the economic and monetary
consequences of the new energy situation would be
less serious for the USA than for most of the other
industrialized countries. Thus the 'third' dollar
devaluation which had occurred in the exchange
markets between February and July was completely
reversed in a few weeks. By the end of the year, the
dollar rate was back at its nominal parity against the
group of currencies in the Community snake.
CHAPTER II
ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION
8. At their meeting on 19 and 20 October 1972
the Heads of State or of Government declared that
the necessary decisions should be taken in the
course of 1973 so as to allow the transition to the
second stage of economic and monetary union on 1
January 1974'. Although the successive monetary
crises have brought about unusual difficulties, it was
possible to take some decisions in this connection.
9. On 11 March 1973, the Council decided to
adapt the Community exchange rate system: by this
decision the fluctuation margin between the German
mark, the Danish krone, the Dutch guilder, the
Belgian franc, the Luxembourg franc and the French
franc was maintained at 2'25 % and the central
banks were no longer required to intervene  vis-a.-vis
the United States dollar. To protect this Community
scheme, which is designed to maintain orderly
exchange rate relations, the Council further agreed
that the Directive of 21 March 1972 would be more
effectively enforced by Member States in order to
prevent disruptive capital movements.
10. Pursuant to the declaration of the summit
conference of 19 and 20 October 1972 the
Regulation establishing a European Monetary
Cooperation Fund (1) was adopted by the Council on
April 1973 after prior examination by the
Committee of Governors of Central Banks, the
Monetary Committee and the conference of the
Ministers of Finance. This Fund, which commenced
operation on 1 June, and intended to be integrated at
later stage into a Community organization of
central banks, is, within the limits of its powers, to
promote:
the proper functioning of the progressive
narrowing of the margins of fluctuation of the
Community currencies against each other;
interventions in Community currencies on the
exchange markets;
) OJ No L 89, 5. 4. 1973.No C 123/4 Official- Journal of the European Communities 14. 10. 74
settlements between central banks leading to 
concerted policy on reserves.
In the first stage of its functions, the Fund is to be
responsible for:
the concerted action necessary for the proper
functioning of the Community exchange system;
the multilateralization of positions resulting
from interventions by central banks 
Community currencies and the multilateralization
of intra-Community settlements;
the administration of the very short-term
financing provided for by the Agreement between
the central banks of the enlarged Community of
10 April 1972 and of the short-term monetary
support provided for in the Agreement between
the' central banks of the Community of 9
February 1970, to which the central banks of
Denmark Ireland and the United Kingdom
acceded with effect from 8 January 1973, with
the regroupment of these mechanisms in a
renewed mechanism.
11. In order to prepare the transition to the
second stage of economic and monetary union, the
Commission took several steps in the economic and
monetary spheres during the period under review. On
19 April 1973, it adopted a communication 'on the
progress achieved in the first stage of economic and
monetary union, on the allocation of powers and
responsibilities among the Community institutions
and the Member States essential to the proper
functioning of economic and monetary union, and
on the measures to be taken in the second stage of
economic and monetary union . In - this report
drawn up in accordance with the Council resolution
of 22 March 1971 and the communique issued at the
Paris summit conference, the Commission reviewed
the progress achieved in the first stage and drew the
following conclusions: the actions included in this
first stage should be consolidated and rigorously
applied particularly those concerning economic
policies; structural and regional problems should
receive prior attention; in certain important fields
effective responsibility must be exercised at
Community level; the Community must constitute a
single monetary zone as soon as possible; the
principle economic and social groups should be more
and more associated with the European enterprise. In
addition, this communication from the Commission
set out a programme of action for a second stage
which was to start on 1 January 1974.
Further, on 27 June 1973 the Commission presented
a 'report on the adjustment of short-term monetary
support and the conditions for the progressive
pooling of reserves' as requested by the Council on
4 February 1973. In this report, the Commission
proposed that more important tasks be entrusted to
the European Monetary Cooperation Fund. It
believes that the reorganization of the credit system
and the pooling of reserves should go together and
be undertaken without delay. According to these
proposals, the Member States should have begun to
pool their reserves and to improve Community credit
mechanisms on 1 January 1974.
12. In the light of the discussion of these reports
on 14 and 15 11ay and on 28 June 1973 in the
Council, and in view of the opinions expressed by
the Committee of Governors of Central Banks and
by the Monetary Committee on 14 November 1973
the Commission adopted a document entitled 'work on economic and monetary union (1)', which
contained a number of legal instruments intended to
make possible the transition to a second stage of
economic and monetary union.
On the first perusal of these proposals, the Council
decided at its session of 3 and 4 December 1973 to
separate the adjustment of short-term monetary
support from the progressive pooling of reserves. It
called on the Monetary Committee, the Committee
of Governors of Central Banks and the Board of
Governors of the European Monetary Cooperation
Fund to submit, by 31 March 1974 reports on the
still outstanding technical problems inherent in the
pooling of reserves, and invited the Commission to
amend its proposals by 30 April 1974 in the light of
these reports. The Council stated that it intended to
examine the Commission s revised proposal at the
latest by 30 June 1974. The Commission was further
invited to prepare a new proposal for the adjustment
of short-term monetary support to be discussed by
the Council before the end of 1973.
13. At its session of 17 December 1973, the
Council and the representatives of the Governments
of the Member States agreed in principle on a
resolution on the implementation of a second stage
of economic and monetary union in the Community.
This resolution lists the objectives to be achieved
during a second stage, from 1 January 1974 to 31
December 1976 as  prerequisite for the
establishment of full economic and monetary union.
(1) OJ No C 114, 27. 12. 1973.14. 10. 74 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 123/5
However, the resolution could not be formally
adopted, pending the solution of problems with
regard to the Regional Development Fund. During
the same meeting the Council reached an agreement
in principle with regard to a number of important
instruments to strengthen economic and monetary
Unlon.
These instruments which were formally adopted
on 18 February 1974, are as follows:
Directive (1) concerning stability, growth and
full employment in the Community, whereby
Member States undertake to enlarge the range of
their economic policy instruments, thus fulfilling
an essential condition for more effective
coordination of their economic policies at
Community level;
a Decision (1) concerning the achievement of a
high degree of convergence of the economic
policies pursued by the Member States of the
EEC; this decision aims at substantially
strengthening and improving consultation
procedures in the economic and monetary field
within all competent Community bodies
(Council, Committee of Governors of Central
Banks, Monetary Committee, and Coordination
Group);
Decision (1 setting up an Economic Policy
Committee; by this Decision the Budgetary Policy
Committee, the Conjunctural Policy Committee
and the Medium-term Economic Policy
Committee are merged to form a single Economic
Policy Committee thus ensuring greater
effectiveness when it has to examine Community
problems or, as a consultative body, to deliver
technical opinions on specific problems;
resolution on short-term monetary support
which requests the Board of Governors of the
European Monetary Cooperation Fund 
amend the short-term monetary support
mechanism by doubling the debtor quotas
quadrupling the creditor quotas and increasing
the extensions beyond the debtor and creditor
quotas to 1 500 million units of account each.
14. In application of the Council resolution of 5
December 1972, the Member States took a series of
anti-inflationary measures (d. paragraph 26). How-
ever, the efficacy of these measures appears to have
been limited: in 1973 inflation in the Community
continued and even increased at a faster rate than
111 previous years. Although the influences from
) OJ No L 63, 5. 3. 1974.
outside the Community should not be under-
estimated the inflationary process in member
countries was probably largely due to factors of
internal origin.
It is clear that the persistence of a high rate of infla-
tion in member countries constitutes a grave threat
to the maintenance of a satisfactory equilibrium
growth rate and the achievement of economic and
monetary union. Under these circumstances, Member
States therefore devoted considerable attention
during the year to examining measures that might be
taken to combat inflation and to coordinate their
policies in this field.
15. On 22 March, on the basis of a Commission
communication concerning the adjustment of the
economic policy guidelines for 1973, the Council un-
dertook, in accordance with Article 2 of the Council
Decision of 22 March 1971 on the strengthening of
coordination of short-term economic policies of the
Member States, a first examination of the economic
situation for 1973. After studying the results of the
anti-inflationary action, programme laid down in its
resolution of 5 December 1972, the Council invited
the Coordination Group on Short-term Economic
and Financial Policies, the Monetary Committee, the
Conjunctural Policy Committee and the Budgetary
Policy Committee, to submit by 1 June 1973, reports
on methods of supervising trends in prices and in-
comes, the implementation of national budgets and
the trend of the money supply.
16. In the light of these reports, the Commission
drafted a communication as a preparation for the
second examination of the economic situation in the
Community, which the Council carried out at its ses-
sion on 28 June 1973. In view of the persistent rise
in prices, the Council adopted at that meeting, on
the proposal of the Commission, a resolution (2) on
further measures to be taken against inflation.
17. Similarly, at the third examination of the eco-
nomic situation of the Community by the Council
on 9 November 1973, the problem of inflation was
central to the discussion. At that session, the Council
examined the measures taken by Member States pur-
suant to the resolution of 14 September 1973 (3), and
on the Commission s proposal, adopted the annual
report on the economic situation in the Community.
It also agreed on the economic policy guidelines for
1974 set out in the report and decided, mainly on
) This resolution was only formally adopted on 14 Sep-
tember J973 (OJ No C 75 , 19. 9. 1973).
) OJ No C 107, 8. 12. J973.No C 123/6 Official Journal of the European Communities 14. 10. 74
account of the new situation arising from the energy
crisis, to lay down at its meeting of 3 and 4 Decem-
ber additional measures to combat inflation in the
coming months.
18. On a Commission proposal, the Council set
out these additional measures on 3 and 4 December
in the 'resolution (1) on measures to be taken against
rising prices and the maintenance of a high level of
employment in the Community . The programme of
action which is to be implemented immediately and
in parallel in the various countries of the Communi-
ty covers measures in the fields of budgetary policy,
monetary and credit policy, prices and incomes poli-
cy, agricultural policy and commercial policy.
) This resolution is dated 17 December 1973 (OJ No
C 116, 29. 12. 1973).
CHAPTER III
ECONOMIC AND MONETARY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE COMMUNITY
19. The developments on the foreign exchange
markets in 1973 did not have any perceptible adverse
effects on international trade. There was in fact 
sharp upswing in international trade, stimulated by
an appreciable acceleration in economic growth in
the industrialized countries, especially during the
first half of the year. Whereas economic growth in
the United States continued at much the same rapid
pace as during the preceding year (60/'0), Japan and
the other OECD countries which are not members of
the Community achieved growth rates which were
distinctly higher than 1972. The considerably
increased proceeds from the sale of raw materials
also helped to boost economic expansion in many
developing countries. These various factors gave a
strong impetus to international trade which rose by
some 13 % in volume. The expansion of world trade
was however accompanied by an upsurge in prices
which reached record proportions in almost every
country.
20. All the Member States of the Community
experienced boom conditions in 1973. Economic
activity expanded at a very rapid pace especially
during the first half of the year; it was not until the
second half of the year that certain differences in
trend between countries and between sectors of
activity led to an overall slowdown in growth.
The growth rate of the Community s gross product
in real terms in 1973 was nevertheless higher than in
1972 (plus 5  against 3'70/0). Year on year,
expansion speeded up in almost all the Member
States: in France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg,
Italy and the United Kingdom.
21. In general, export demand was a major factor in
growth throughout the year; in Denmark and Italy,
however, the volume of exports rose more slowly
than in 1972. Domestic demand also expanded at a
very rapid pace in most countries although
indications of deceleration were apparent in the
second half of the year.
While public investment showed only moderate
growth or no growth at all, the pace of private
investment quickened appreciably in France
Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Italy and the United
Kingdom.
The sharp rise in household money incomes, the
persistence of inflationary expectations and
certain countries, the effects of a decline in the
propensity to save, which became particularly
noticeable during the final months of the year
stimulated private consumption expenditure, which
climbed particularly steeply in Ireland and Italy. The
rate of growth of public current expenditure 
n~oney terms slackened a little in France, Belgium
;lnd Ireland, but accelerated in Germany and Italy. In
the Netherlands, this expenditure stopped falling in
real terms.
Finally, the continued upsurge in the prices of a
large number of raw materials and the expectation
of further increases contributed to a rise in stocks
which was sometimes considerable.
22. The high level of economic activity led to 
rise in employment in all countries until the end of
the autumn. The improvement was particularly
marked in Italy and the United Kingdom. However
labour market trends were relatively disappointing in Belgium and the Netherlands where the
unemployment rate was almost as high as during the
previous year. In these countries, as in some others
in some of which a large number of foreign workers
are employed, residual unemployment is due in part
to structural causes. Towards the end of the year
unemployment rose again in most countries and
there was an increase  quite considerable in some
cases  in the number of persons on short time,
principally because of the repercussions of the energy
CrISIS.14. 10. 74 Official J~)Urnal of the European Communities No C 123/7
23. The boom in the Community was
accompanied by very heavy inflationary pressures
throughout the year. While in some countries the
upward movement of prices slackened a little at the
beginning of the summer, inflation in all member
countries accelerated again during the final months.
Consumer prices in the Community as a whole
showed an increase in December 1973 of more than
8 % on December of the previous year. In Denmark
Ireland, Italy and the United Kingdom the rise in the
cost of living even exceeded 10 % over this period.
This trend was due to the particularly sharp rise in
the cost of raw materials and to an increase in
labour costs which largely exceeded the growth of
prod1:1ctivity. The vigorous expansion in domestic
and export demand in most countries led to a high
degree of capacity utilization. from the beginning of
the year. Even in countries such as Italy, where there
still had been a certain amount of spare capacity at
the beginning of the period, the speeding-up of
economic activity gave rise to bottlenecks which
soon impeded the growth of production in some
sectors. Moreover, towards the end of the year, the
situation deteriorated still further as a result of the
massive increase in the price of oil and the
strengthening of the dollar on the foreign exchange
markets.
24. The domestic demand boom in the Member
States, together with the appreciable increase in the
cost of imports, entailed a considerable deterioration
in the Community s balance of payments on current
account, the surplus falling from $ 6 700 million in
1972 to $ 700 million in 1973.
Within this overall result the trends differed very
sharply from one member country to another. There
was a very marked deterioration in the balance of
payments on current account in Italy and the United
Kingdom  notably as a result of the adverse swing
in their terms of trade  and in Denmark. In the
United Kingdom, the 1973 trade balance closed with
a deficit of f 2375 million and the current account
showed a deficit of f 1 468 million, compared with
a surplus of f 69 million in 1972; in Italy the trade
deficit totalled Lit 3 366 000 million in 1973 and the
current account deficit Lit 2 352 000 million; in
Denmark the deficit on current account also rose
sharply, principally because of the deterioration in
the trade balance. In Germany, on the other hand
where the deterioration in the terms of trade was
relatively moderate owing to the effects on import
prices of the revaluation of the German mark, the
trade surplus reached the record figure of D1--1
33 000 million, while the balance of payments 
current account closed with a surplus of DM 12 400
million (compared to DM 3 300 million in 1972).
25. This generally poor trend in the Community
balance of payments on current account contrasts
with a spectacular improvement in the United States
foreign trade position. After very heavy deficits
during the first half of 1973, the US balance of
payments on official settlements basis (less SDRs)
showed surpluses of $ 2 100 million and $ 2 700
million in the third and fourth quarters respectively
(seasonally adjusted), bringing the deficit for 1973 as
a whole to $ 5 300 million compared to $ 11 000
million in 1972. This turnaround was due mainly to
the trend in the trade balance (fob), which after
recording a deficit in 1972 of $ 6 400 million
moved into a surplus in 1973 of  1 700 million
(fob). The basic balance closed with a surplus of
$ 1 200 million following a deficit of $ 9 800 million in 1972. This development enabled the US
authorities to relax the restrictions on outflows of
capital in November.
26. Faced with alarming price increases, all the
Member States implemented restrictive economic
policies at the beginning of the year, although Italy,
which had suffered from a period of stagnation
during the two previous years did not do so until the
end of the second quarter. In order to combat
inflation they employed a wide range of instruments
ranging from monetary and fiscal policy to prices
and incomes policies.
The policy of restricting liquidity, initiated in 1972
in most Member States, was tightened repeatedly
during the year in order to limit supply and curb
demand. Implementation of this policy was helped
by the floating of the dollar and by increases in
interest rates on the principal foreign markets and on
the international market generally, which afforded
the monetary authorities more room to manoeuvre.
Most countries restricted access to central bank
finance and implemented general or selective
increases in compulsory reserve ratios, relating either
to banks' liabilities or to their assets and liabilities.
Some countries also introduced or strengthened
arrangements for setting quantitative ceilings on
lending. In order to protect their domestic economies
from external influences and to lessen the impact of
such influences on the Community s exchange rate
system capital movements were subjected to
restrictive measures bearing on commercial banks
net external positions; non-residents' balances or
foreign borrowing by non-bank institutions. The
monetary authorities of all the Member States raised
the cost of rediscounting with the central bank by
putting up official discount rates several times.
Discount rates in almost all the Member States
therefore reached new record levels at the end of the
year. These measures led to a considerable increaseNo C 123/8 Official Journal of the European Communities 14. 10. 74
in the rates on the money market
, .
and, except in
Italy, to an appreciable rise in long-term interest
rates.
Except in Italy and the Netherlands, the use of
monetary policy, sometimes intensively, resulted in a
marked slowdown in the expansion of the money
supply. But, with regard to a total liquidity,
including short-term saving, the slowdown was more
moderate; in some countries there was even an
increase. This trend is mainly due to the
continuation of bank lending at a high level.
Moreover monetary policy in countries with
demand pressures was not always backed up
sufficiently by fiscal policy. Only three countries
(France Germany and Denmark) had large budget
surpluses, as a result of the use of budgetary
measures in the fight against inflatiqn. In the United
Kingdom measures to restrict public expenditure
were taken at the end of the year, but the effect of
these wi1l not be felt until 1974. The budgetary
policies pursued by the other countries were neutral
but more often than not stimulated the expansion of
liquidity, especially in Italy and, to a lesser extent, in
Belgi um.
CHAPTER IV
THE ACTIVITIES OF THE MONETARY COMMITTEE
27. The Monetary Committee devoted most of its
time to considering problems arising from events in
the monetary field, to examining measures connected
with the progressive establishment of economic and
monetary union and to preparing the work, at
Community level, on the reform of the international
monetary system.
28. When the monetary crisis broke out 
February, the committee discussed the consequences
of the United States Government decision to
devalue the dollar and of the Italian Government
decision to .let the commercial lira float. It also
examined the measures taken by Germany on
5 February 1973 to stem the inflow of foreign capital.
In this connection it was noted in particular that the
derogations from the Directives implementing Article
67 of the EEC Treaty, which such measures
involved could be justified by invoking' the
safeguard clause provided for in Article 109.
29. The monetary events in March and the
resolution of the ensuing crisis involved the
Monetary Committee on several occasions. To begin
with, in preparation for the Council session of 4
March it discussed in particular an oral
communication from the Commission concerning
the creation of a Community exchange system . In
accordance with the brief it had received from the
Council, it then analysed the proposals which the
Commission had put to the Council on 4 March and
the various suggestions for overcoming the crisis
made at that session. The committee recorded the
results of this discussion in two documents. The
first concerning the implementation of 
Community exchange rate scheme, was the basis of
the Council's work at its session of 11 and 12 March
during which it decided to introduce a joint
float of certain Community currencies. The second
concerning international cooperation measures for
the protection of exchange parities on a world level,
formed the basis of the Community s position at the
international consultations in the enlarged Group of
Ten on 9 March.
30. As part of the work on the establishment of
economic and monetary union, the committee, at its
meeting of 6 and 7' March, adopted an Opinion (1
on a proposal for a Decision establishing a European
Monetary Cooperation Fund. The committee further
drew up an Opinion (2) on the monetary aspects of
the Commission communication to the Council of
19 April 1973 on the 'progress achieved in the first
stage of economic and monetary union, and on the
measures to be taken in the second stage . Finally, in
accordance with the brief it had received from the
Council on 18 June 1973~ it examined, at its
meetings of 10 and 19 October 1973, the 'report
from the Commission to the Council on the
adjustment of short-term monetary support
arrangements and the conditions for the progressive
pooling of reserves , and adopted an Opinion (3) on
it.
) See Annex I.
) See Annex II.
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In preparation for the move to the second stage of
economic and monetary union the committee
analysed the monetary aspects of the proposal for a
Council Decision concerning the achievement of a
high degree of convergence of the economic policies
pursued by the Member States of the EEC, and on
the Council resolution concerning short-term
monetary support. As a result of this preparatory
work, carried out jointly with the Committee of
Central Bank Governors, the Council reached an
agreement in principle on these proposals on
17 December 1973.
31. On account of the continued instability of the
international monetary situation and pursuant to
Council Regulation No 129, the committee had, on
several occasions, to examine the problems
concerning the unit of account and its conversion
into national currencies for the purpose of the
common agricultural policy and to prepare oral or
written opinions on the matter. The consultations
principally concerned the conversion rates of the
British pound, the Irish pound, the Dutch guilder
and the Italian lira to be used in the common
agricultural policy and the establishment of a new
method of calculating levies and monetary
compensatory amounts by reference to the joint float
rather than the dollar.
32. The Monetary Committee also continued to
keep the monetary and financial situation in the
Member States regularly under review. Pursuant to
Article III of the Agreement between the Community
central banks on short-term monetary support, it
held special consultations at its meeting on 19 and
20 July 1973, on the situation in Italy, following the
decision to make support facilities available to that
country in June. The conclusions of the
consultations were set out in a report which was
transmitted to the President of the Commission, the
President-in-office of the Council, the Chairman of
the Committee of Governors of Central Banks and of
the Board of Governors of the European Monetary
Cooperation Fund, and to the Italian Finance
Minister. When the period of support was extended
the committee re-examined the situation in Italy with
particular reference to the economic measures
adopted by the Italian authorities in the meantime.
Finally, the committee discussed in depth the
monetary implications of the energy crisis for the
Community. In this context the committee stated its
intention to keep developments under review
particularly the monetary measures which the
Member States might adopt to mitigate the effects of
the crisis.
33. At its meeting on 6 and 7 February the
Monetary Committee broadened the terms of
reference of the Working Party on Short-term
Capital Movements (see section 20 of the fourteenth
report on the activities of the Monetary Committee).
It instructed the working party to examine the
possibility of harmonizing the existing restrictions on
the free movement of capital and to find out what
exceptions could be made for transactions between
Member States.
On 9 October 1973 the working party presented the
committee with a report on both parts of these terms
of reference. With regard to the second part, it
pointed out, that it would not be possible to
harmonize exchange control instruments and to
introduce a preferential system for Community
transactions until a political stimulus" had been given
to the solution of certain problems which did not
fall within its competence. It emphasized 
particular that technical studies concerning the
harmonization of controls and exceptions to be
made for transactions between the Member States
could not proceed any faster than economic and
monetary union itself. The working party suggested
to the Monetary Committee a three-stage procedure
for any further work on harmonization beginning
with a first stage instituting a forum for centralizing
and exchanging technical information on various
measures on exchange control.
34. The Working Party on Securities Markets
continued to examine developments in the capital
markets of the Member States, in the international
capital market and in capital marked policies. It
presented a report (1) on its activities, the conclusions
of which were approved by the Monetary
Committee.
35. The Monetary Committee and the Committee
of Central Bank Governors had already been called
upon in the Council resolution and the representatives
of the Governments of the Member States of 22
March 1971 on the establishment by stages of
economic and monetary union (point IlLS), to
continue 'their work on the harmonization of the
instruments of monetary - policy in close
collaboration with each other . In accordance with
this mandate, the two committees had set up a Joint
Working Party on the Harmonization of Monetary
Policy Instruments, which, for technical reasons, had
not been able to begin its work. In agreement with
the Committee of Central Bank Governors, the
Monetary Committee decided to entrust a new
) See Annex V.No C 123/10 Official Journal of the European Communities 14. 10. 74
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mandate .,10 this working party, which should in  the Council resolution of
14 September 1973 concerning additional measures
to be taken in the fight against inflation, the
Monetary Committee, an the Committee of Central
Bank Governors requested the group of experts
trends in the money supply' presided by 
Bastiaanse to prepare a report on the results
obtained in the field of monetary policy under the
requirements of this resolution.
36. The work of the Monetary Committee in the
field of international monetary reform was mainly
concerned with the preparation at Community level
of the meetings of the Committee of Twenty and of
its deputies, the latter committee having been set the
task of preparing proposals for the reform of the
international monetary system. This enabled the
Community to adopt a common position on certain
important points connected with reform at the
meetings of the Committee of Twenty in March and
July and at the annual meeting of the IMF in
September.
After adopting a document entitled 'process of
adjustment  use of quantitative indicators' (see
section  2S  of the fourteenth annual report), the
Committee was able to reach a common position, at
its meeting of 1 May, on the problem of 'reserve
assets and convertibility , and to make a statement
before  the  deputies of the Committee of Twenty (1
Furthermore, this body was presented with a report
) Document given in Annex IV.
on a 'system of multiple currency intervention
drawn up by the group of experts under the
chairmanship of Mr Theron, at the request of the
Monetary Committee and the Committee of Central
Bank Governors.
Other problems, such as the future structure of the
IMF, the consolidation of dollar .balances, the choice
of a 'numeraire , the role of gold, the definition of
the SDRs and the question of the special interests of
the developing countries have not yet been
definitively dealt with by the Monetary Committee
although opinions on certain points have moved
appreciably closer.
Finally, the committee had to deal on several
occasions with the question of the value of SDRs, i.
the problem of converting SDRs into national
currencies. The application of the 'equal value
principle' and of rule 0.3 to Special Drawing Rights
resulted, especially when the rate of the dollar had
depreciated sharply on the foreign exchange markets,
in SDRs being less and less suitable for use in intra-
Community settlements. As a result of the work
done together with the Committee of Central Bank
Governors, a provisional solution was found and
was approved by the Executive Board of the
International Monetary Fund at the beginning of
November. It permits the settlement of debts
between Members of the European Monetary
Cooperation Fund at a rate of one SDR for one
European monetary unit of account (EMUA). The
application of the IMF rules on this matter has been
suspended until 31 October 1974 at the latest.14. 10. 74 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 123/11
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ANNEX 
OPINION OF THE MONETARY COMMITTEE ON THE EUROPEAN FUND FOR
MONETARY COOPERATION
The Commission has asked for the Monetary
Committee Opinion on the proposed Decision to
establish a European Monetary Cooperation Fund which
it must present to the Council. At its meeting of 6 and 7
March 1973, the committee examined this proposal and
it was, in general, favourably received, subject to the
following comments:
It has been suggested by certain members that the
grounds should be shortened and simplified, while at the
same time preserving the essential elements, in order 
emphasize the solemn nature of the act establishing the
Fund in accordance with the Summit communique.
Articles of the Decision
Article 
The members draw attention to the fact that the wording
at the beginning of this Article contains a grammatical
illogicality (it is hard to see how 'the provisions
contained in the Agreements.... shall replace those
Agreements ) and offers certain other ambiguities. A
wording to make the text clearer could be arranged by
replacing 'and' in the second line by 'which' . Certain
members advocate the following wording: 'The Fund
shall apply, in its administration the provisions
appearing in the Agreements mentioned in Article 3, third
indent (the rest unchanged).
On the other hand, the members wonder what procedure
will be adopted for making possible amendments to the
decision and statutes as a result of the evolutive nature of
the Fund.
Statutes
Article 
One member suggests that it would be desirable to grant
a right of veto to the Commission member taking part in
the deliberations of the Board of Directors with a view
to ensuring respect for the Community interest.
Article 
Various amendments to the wording in the first
paragraph of this Article are suggested: one group of
members feels that it would be sufficient to reproduce
the terms of the Summit communique. The following
wording would be equally acceptable to these and certain
other members: 'The Board of Directors, with a view to
achieving the Fund' objectives, shall act within the
framework of general economic policy guidelines drawn
up under the terms of the Treaty by the Council (of
Ministers) and  in accordance with the guidelines
concerning the Fund' principles of administration
recommended by it
Another group of members recommends the wording:
The Board of Directors, with a view to achieving the
Fund' s objectives, shall act. 
. . . 
by the Council (of
Ministers) and  in accordance with the Directives the
latter may issue whenever it considers necessary
Members in favour of one or other of the above
versions also consider that it would be advisable, under
these conditions, to lay down the procedure to be
followed by the Council of Ministers in this matter.
Lastly, a third group of members recommends the
retention of the text drawn up by the Commission, with
the exception of the following words: '... in accordance
with the procedures laid down under Article 103 of the
Treaty
Article 
The members suggest that the words ' and represent it in
law' be added to this first paragraph.
Article  second paragraph
The members consider that it is premature to introduce
provisions into the statutes concerning allocations of any
profits that may accrue.
Article 
Certain members consider that the wording of this
Article satisfies the requirements in respect of the Fund'
tasks for the first stage. It could therefore be retained
provisionally on the understanding that, as provided for
in the last paragraph, the political authoritic::s would
reserve the right to redefine the unit of account at any
time.
Other members feel that it would be preferable, in the
prevailing circumstances, if the definition of the unit of
account and of the procedures to be adopted in the event
of a redefinition were to appear in the annex and were
to be adopted provisionally.
Then again, there are other members who emphasize that
they are not yet in a position to express an opinion, since
the committee has not had the opportunity to examine
the problem in sufficient depth. As far as they are
concerned, it would be perfectly feasible to set up the
Fund prior to a settlement of the problem of the unit of
account, while embarking as soon as possible on a study
based mainly on the technical report just completed by
an expert group.
In addition, the majority of the members drew attention
to the desirability of including in the last paragraph a
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Article 
The members suggest that this Article be supplemented in
so far as the Fund's legal capacity is concerned. They
would insert after the words 'immoveable or moveable
to open accounts with the Community central banks
and conclude agreements with the latter
Articles  , 8 and 
The Committee has not examined in depth the legal
problems raised by these Articles nor the question of the
financial supervision of the Fund.
':. ':.
Finally, some proposals for amendments to the wording
are set out below:
One member considers that the beginning of the third
ground should read as follows: 'Whereas the report
on the organization, functions and statutes of an
EFMC" of the Monetary Council and the Council of
Governors of the Central Banks as well as their
Opinions of 5 and 11 September 1972 have been
referred to the Council and whereas the meeting of
the Heads of Government. . .' (the rest unchanged).
The Agreement between the Community central
banks on short-term currency support bears the date
9 February 1970 (fourth ground and Article 3 of the
Decision).
The second indent in Article 2 of the Decision should
read as follows: ' interventions in Community
currencies on the exchange markets
In the German text of Article 1 (3) of the Statutes, the
words. 'of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg' should
be replaced with 'of the Luxembourg monetary
authorities , in accordance with the French text.
The figure 1 to be deleted each time it appears after
the word 'Annex
In order to avoid any confusion, the word 'Council'
should, if necessary, be clarified to show whether it is
the 'Council of Ministers' or the 'Board of Directors
of the Fund' that is meant.
ANNEX II
OPINION ON THE COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION
TO THE COUNCIL OF 19 APRIL 1973
The Monetary Committee, at its meeting on 21 and 22
June 1973 examined the communication from the
Commission to the Council of 19 April 1973 which
related to the progress made during the first stage of
Economic and Monetary Union; to the distribution of
powers and responsibility between the institutions of the
Community and the Member States, which is necessary
for the proper functioning of economic and monetary
union, and to the measures to be adopted during the
second stage of this union.
In accordance with the powers rested in it, the committee
reviewed all the monetary questions raised by this
document. The committee, without defining its position
on all of the individual suggestions which appear in the
Commission s document, wishes to formulate a number
of observations, in the same order as the Commission
proposals. They can be summarized as follows.
I. REVIEW OF THE FIRST STAGE OF EMU
On the whole, the Committee agreed with the analysis
made in the document regarding the results obtained
during the first stage. Some members, however, would
like the causes for failures in various fields to be analysed
in greater depth. Finally other members pointed out that
while reviewing the first stage, it was advisable to keep
in mind the exceptional nature of this period, due to the
successive crisis in the international monetary system. In
spite of the difficulties during this delicate period, it had
been possible to make some definite progress, in
particular:
intervention in Community currencies as part of the
system of reduced margins of fluctuation;
common position towards the dollar;
creation of a European Monetary Cooperation Fund.
The Committee would like all the Member States to
become involved in all these matters as soon as possible
since they constitute an important advance for the
Community, in accordance with the resolutions regarding
the first stage and with the Council Decisions of 11
March 1973.
II. THE ACTION PROGRAMME FOR THE SECOND
STAGE
1. General remarks
The committee was also in agreement with the basic
concept of the proposals made by the Commission. These
aimed towards a sufficiently balanced group of actions
covering both the monetary and economic fields;14. 10. 74 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 123/15
However the committee reiterated the need, in carrying
out this 'action programme, to bear in mind the principle
of parallel progress both in monetary policy, and in
principle economic policy in general which was
recognized by the Council resolution of 22 March 1971.
Taking into account the limited progress made during the
first stage regarding the effective coordination of internal
economic and monetary policies, this principle of
parallelism implies that the Community should pay full
attention to the effort which remains to be made in this
field, while at the same time continuing with its progress
in the field of external monetary policy.
2. Specific proposals in the monetary field
(a)  Financing of budget deficits
The Committee considered it to be very important to
coordinate the policies relating to the financing of budget
deficits.
It suggested that coordination in this field should be
concerned with the size of the budget deficits, and on
the means by which they are financed, rather than with
prior consultation on each loan.
In fact the committee considered that prior consultation
on the issuing of any national loan would not be easy to
achieve, since it was very difficult to ensure the necessary
secrecy regarding the date and the terms of such loans.
This was especially true in some countries, where the
system of financing budget deficits prevented any prior
consultation from taking place. Moreover, the committee
expressed a reservation regarding the Commission
suggestion of fixing 'ceilings for the short-term
financing of budget deficits. Since cash requirements vary
so greatly from time to time, since it is so difficult to
make rigorous provisions for these variations, and since
the monetary consequences of the different types of
short-term indebtedness are so diverse, it appears to be
more realistic to submit the problem of financing
budgetary balances to periodic and concerted
examination.
(b)  Coordination of monetary policies
In the committee s opinion the coordination of
monetary and credit policy within the Community, and
the stepping-up of the efforts made towards a
harmonization of the machinery for implementing this
policy, were extremely important. This harmonization
should enable a whole range of machinery to be defined
from which the monetary authorities in the Member
States would be able to choose that best corresponding to
the circumstances at the time.
At the present stage in the development of the EMU, the
committee considered that it would be neither useful nor
advisable to establish uniform rules for national
monetary policy. They believed that the right procedure
to take would be to determine, by common agreement,
the monetary factors to be taken into account and to
establish norms for this purpose which make allowance
for the various situations in the Member States.
The Committee realized that the Community must pay
particular attention to reaching a common position on
international monetary relations, to be expressed where
appropriate by  single spokesman. Some members
pointed in this connection that it was agreed at the Paris
summit conference, that the Member States would aim to
contribute to the reform of the international monetary
system, by adopting a common position, and that they
should be in a position to put forward modified opinions
where necessary.
(c)  The exchange system and the European Monetary
Cooperation Fund
The Commission rightly stressed how important it was
for the currencies of all Member States to participate in
the Community exchange system. However, in order to
ensure that this system had a stable basis and avoid the
changes of new failures, it was vital that economic
conditions should be favourable to it and that there
should be effective policy coordination at Community
level. The same considerations would apply also to any
narrowing of the margins of fluctuation at a later date. A
European Monetary Cooperation Fund working
efficiently would help solve the problems which are likely
to arise in this field.
The committee reserved the right to decide on the
appropriation for the European Monetary Cooperation
Fund and on the possibility of creating a European unit
of account when the Commission submits the report on
the adjustment of short-term monetary support and the
progressive pooling of reserves.
The Council resolution of 22 March 1971 lays down that
the Fund will eventually have to be integrated in the
Community system of central banks. The Fund should be
equipped with the functions of a central bank only
gradually, and these would be extended subsequently.
The need for effective control of unsettling capital
movements had been amply demonstrated by the recent
monetary crises. The committee therefore endorsed the
Commission proposal on this matter. However
would stress that the harmonization of national control
mechanism and their variants in intra- and extra-
Community relations should take account of the
structural conditions in the various Member States and of
differing opinions on economic policy. .
The committee approved the principle advanced by the
Commission whereby the Community would have the
right to supervise adjustments in exchange ratios.
However, it noted that the Commission proposal raised a
number of delicate institutional and practical problems.
In any event, the committee considered that the proposal
did not in any way change the existing situation where
the final decision on parity continued to rest with the
Member States concerned, since any other solution could
only be considered at a later stage in the development of
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(d)  The capital market
If a common market presupposed a common external
strategy, the latter did not necessarily involve restricting
capital movements from and to third countries. Certain
committee members felt that the Community s obligation
under the EEC Treaty to adopt as liberal a policy on the
matter as circumstances allowed was not given sufficient
weight in the observations on the document.
Moreover, the retention of controls for certain types of
capital movement, even within the Community, could
prove necessary under the international monetary system
in its existing form. The committee was aware, however,
that such exceptional cases should be restricted to a
ml111mum.
(e)  The Community budget
The Commission proposed that under the coming system
for the Community s own resources, the Community
could well be authorized to finance short-term
Community budget deficits by drawing on the money
market. Rules and procedures would have to drawn up
to prevent excessive relaxation of the restraints on the
Community budgetary policies and to ensure that
monetary equilibrium in general and money market
stability in particular were not disturbed. Indeed, certain
members considered that the raising of Community loans
was neither necessary nor progress.
ANNEX III
OPINION ON THE REPORT FROM THE
COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL OF 27 JUNE 1973
At its meetings of 10 and 19 October 1973, the Monetary
Committee as requested on 28 June 1973 by the Council
of the European Communities examined the 'report from
the Commission to the Council on the adjustment of
short-term monetary support arrangements and the
conditions for the progressive pooling of reserves
1. General remarks
The report of the Commission includes proposals aimed
at establishing important elements of the basic structure
for economic and monetary union. It answers the request
made by the heads of State or Government meeting in
Paris on 19 and 20 October 1972 that two reports be
prepared: before 30 September 1973 on the
reorganization of the short-term monetary support
scheme and before 31 December 1973 on the conditions
for a progressive pooling of reserves. At its meeting of
14 February 1973 the Council asked the Commission to
submit only one report on both questions before 30 June
1973. A single report permits a global view of the two
problems, which, although quite distinct, are interrelated.
Thus the report submitted by the Commission is within
the framework of the three objectives stated under Point
I of the resolution of 22 March 1971.
Despite the un favourable circumstances within the
Community and outside, it has been possible to create a
Community foreign exchange system and establish the
European Monetary Cooperation Fund. The Community
must pursue and direct its efforts towards improvement
in the coordination of economic and monetary policies,
amongst others, interest-rate policies and the control of
destabilizing capital movements. In this field, special
emphasis should be placed on faster and more substantial
progress. Community efforts must equally be directed
towards the maintenance and reinforcement of the
Community exchange rate system, so that new progress
can be achieved in keeping stable the ratios between the
exchange rates of the Member States' currencies. The
Commission is endeavouring to meet both these
objectives in the report which is the subject of this
opInIOn.
In this present opinion, the Committee has not examined in detail the technical problems raised in the
Commission s report; they have already been dealt with
in the Opinion of the Committee of the Governors of the
Central Banks of the Member States of the Community
and the Council of Administration of the EMCF.
II. Reorganization of credit facilities
The system envisaged by the Commission (d. Annex),
would substantially increase the potential amount of
credit that could be given simultaneously as of right to
all Member States because the amount that could be
drawn, as of right, by any Member State, would be
unaffected by the granting of support to other member
countries, in contrast to the present system where a single
country can exhaust most of the available resources.
Within the framework of the actions to be carried out in
order to safeguard and strengthen the Community foreign
exchange system, it is essential that existing credit
mechanisms should be improved. The Committee thinks
that an increase in available credit facilities is justified 
appropriate circumstances. Opinions verge, however, on
the importance of changes to be made in the volume 
available credits, their maturity and the degree to which
they are automatically available;
Certain members think that the increase in debtor quotas
suggested by the Commission should be less, due to the
risks of inflation inherent in a substantial increase in
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creation of liquidity in any future international monetary
system. Furthermore, an increase in automatic facilities
might weaken the element of integration inherent in the
Community exchange rate system. According to these
members it is also necessary to avoid the risk of a single
country having to carry the whole burden of financing.
The other members accept the increase in facilities
proposed by the Commission, taking into account the
importance of destabilizing capital flows between
member countries and of the financing requirements
which stem from them. They point out that if the close
link between the adaptation of the credit arrangements
and reserve pooling which the Commission suggest were
accepted, the result would be that the financing of credits
would be undertaken by the EMCF itself and therefore,
in effect, spread amongst all the Member States holding
claims on the Fund.
The extension of credit maturities within the short-term
monetary support scheme from a maximum of six
months to 12 months as proposed by the Commission is
equally considered by certain members as desirable, while
others think that the present maturities are satisfactory.
Finally, the Committee s members are divided as to the
extent to which automatic availability is acceptable for
the granting of credits. Certain members can accept the
suggestions of the Commission such as they stand and
believe that the proposed consultation procedure is
satisfactory. Furthermore, they consider that it would be
useful to study the means and conditions under which the
short-term facility could, in appropriate circumstances, be
extended into medium-term support. The others consider
that any reorganization of the system ought to be based
primarily on an assumption that credits would be
conditional in order to contribute better to the
coordination of economic policies.
III. Pooling of reserves
The pooling of reserves is an important element of
economic and monetary union. It cannot, however, be
conceived in isolation, because parallel progress must be
achieved in other fields.
Three important issues arise: the nature of the pooling
operation, the moment at which it should begin and the
rhythm it should follow.
In the Commission s view the reorganization of the
credit system and the pooling of reserves are clearly
linked and should be undertaken to start without delay.
The pooling of reserves, they say, does not mean that
each Member State makes over to the Community
without compensation, such part of it s reserves that it
pools, but that it exchanges it s pooled reserves for a
European reserve asset created by the EMCF. The
Community system which the Commission advocates
would make it possible in their view, to overcome
present settlements difficulties to strengthen the
multilateral character of the system and to develop the
role of the fund as the tool for monetary cooperation, as
well as the role of the European monetary unit of
account.
Certain members do not share the Commission s view.
They consider that the pooling of reserves is not justified
given the present position in the coordination of
economic policies; indeed it is not necessarily an
instrument capable of reinforcing coordination, but might
even weaken it; moreover, they consider that the
reorganization of the credit facilities does not imply
pooling of reserves. They point out, on the other hand
that certain technical factors make it difficult at present
to transfer certain reserve assets to the Fund (d. Opinion
of the Committee of Governors of the Central Banks and
of the Council of Administration of the Fund, section
II 5 1).
The majority of members, not all of whom think that the
reorganization of credit facilities is necessarily . a
precondition for starting to pool reserves . ~gree In
principle with the Opinion of the CommISSIon and
consider that, particularly for psychological and political
reasons a start, albeit modest, should be made in poolIng
reserve; as quickly as possible. These members consider
that the method of pooling suggested by the Commission
marks a useful step towards the end objective, and does
not run ahead of the principles of parallelism between
economic and monetary progress to which they too
subscribe. They think, moreover, that solutions could 
worked out to the abovementioned technical difficulties
provided that a decision in principle is taken at the
political level. Finally, the establishment of common
reserves could further the objective of giving the
Community an autonomous monetary personality.
IV. Capital of the fund
The committee recognizes the usefulness of endowing the
fund with capital. The Commission suggests that 
should be underwritten in national currencies by the
Member States through a budgetary allocation. If certain
members could bring themselves to agree to the
suggestion, however, the great majority think that the
capital should be underwritten by the central banks.
Taking account of the fact that any returns on the
capital are intended to cover the fund's operating costs
the committee thinks that to begin with, only a small
part of the capital will be required. Thereafter, the
capital could be paid in simultaneously with the
development of the fund' activities.No C 123/18 Official Journal of the European Communities 14. 10. 74
Annex
The comparison shown below between present and proposed. credit arrangements is only
provided for the sake of illustration and does not purport to cover all situations.
1. Amounts available, in millions of units of account:
Short-term monetary
support arrangements
(a)
(i)
Toral
non-automatic
extensions
(ii)
Commission
proposals
(b)
Automatic
quotas
Deutsche Bundesbank
Banque de France
300 1800
300 1800
300 1800
200 1200
100
1 362,5
600
100 600
270
17,5 105
Bank of England
Banca d'ltalia
Banque Nationale de Belgique
N ederlandsche Bank
Danmarks National Bank
Central Bank of Ireland
Under the present system of short-term monetary support arrangements the amount shown
in column (a) (ii) is the' maximum extension available for a single country; the sum total of
extensions outstanding at one time cannot exceed this amount. Creditor countries are not
obliged to extend credit beyond the amount of their creditor quota.
Under the proposed system, this limitation would no longer apply.
2. Duration of credit.
Present system:
(i) under Basle arrangeme'nts: automatic credit, one and a half months plus three months
extension under bilateral agreement;
(ii) short-term monetary support arrangements: three plus three months (consultation
on first drawing).
Proposed system:
(i) under Basle arrangements: automatic credit one and a half months;
(ii) short-term credit: six plus six months (consultation on renewal).
ANNEX IV
RESERVE ASSETS AND CONVERTIBILITY
1. Introduction pressures in the world, and has built up tensions in the.
system that have tended to explode whenever doubts
began to' arise on the sustainibility af the exchange rates
of reserve centres. 
The countries of the European Econamic Cammunity
consider the future system of international reserves to be
ane of the major aspects af international manetary
refarm. The monetary crises that have repeatedly
plagued the warld in the recent past have in no small
measure been due to the uncontrolled growth af currency
reserves. This has added significantly to inflationary
We have stated at various occasions that in our view the
role of reserve currencies shauld be reduced and that af
the SDR should be enhanced. In the final stage, reserve14. 10. 74 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 123/19
currencies should be completely phased out except in
their function of normal working balances.
Because we consider these matters central to the reform
of the international monetary system, representatives of
our countries have made various suggestions with regard
to the problems of reserve assets and convertibility. In an
attempt to make a further contribution to progress in this
area, we have agreed on a common proposal which we
hereby submit to the Committee of Twenty.
The memorandum does not go into problems of
transition. In particular, it does not deal with the
consolidation of existing reserve currency balances
through bilateral funding and/or through a substitution
facility in the IMF. We realize, however, that this
q llestion is intimately related with convertibility and that
it is, indeed, an essential precondition for the proper
function of the reformed system. We intend to make
proposals on this important matter in a separate note.
2. Objectives
We suggest that the proposals for a future system of
reserve assets and convertibility should be judged with
reference to the following primary objectives, which are
largely inspired by what we believe to be the major faults
of the present system.
In addition to these primary objectives, there are a
number of other considerations which we shall not
mention explicitly. An example is the desire of countries
to remain free in the composition of their official
reserves. Since we believe that this freedom must be
limited in the interest of stability, we have not entered
this as one of our objectives. We recognize, however, that
it is a valid goal to minimize the constraints on national
freedom of action to the extent that this is compatible
with the primary objectives of the reform.
(a)  Balance of payments deficits and surpluses should be
reflected in reserve movements
Unlike other countries, reserve centres are able to finance
their deficits by incurring liquid liabilities in their own
currency. To the extent that foreign holders cannot or do
not convert additional reserve currency balances either
into their own currency or into primary assets, the sy~tem
operates in an asymmetrical manner and tends to mask
the need for fundamental balance of payments
adjustment in certain cases. In order to eliminate the
asymmetry and to prevent the instability, caused by
delayed adjustment action and by an excessive build-up
of currency reserves, reserve centres should not finance
their balance of payments deficits by incurring liquid
liabilities in their own currency. Conversely the system
should ensure that reserve centres earn reserve assets when
in surplus.
(b)  International control over the global volume of world
reserves
In the past, world liquidity has increased in a completely
uncontrolled manner as a result of payments deficits of
the reserve centres. This has provided an additional and
very unwelcome stimulus to world inflation; it has
enlarged the quantity of potentially volatile international
capital; and it has left a legacy of excessive official
liquidity in the world. Reserve creation in the future
system should take place only on the basis of
international decisions, based on the criterion of global
need for additional reserves. As stated in the introduction
the manner in which excess internationalliquiditjr can 
eliminated will not be considered at this point. 
(c)  The instability due to shifts in the composition of
official reserves should be eliminated
Shifts in the composition of official reserves between
primary reserves and reserve currencies as well 
between different reserve currencies (including various
new reserve currencies) have compounded the problem 
excessive international liquidity creation and have
produced large flows of capital that have tended to
interfere with an orderly system of exchange rates.
As we mentioned in the introduction, we believe that
these problems should be mainly solved by reducing the
role of reserve currencies and by enhancing that of the
SDR. The ultimate goal should be to reduce the amounts
of reserve currencies held by the non-reserve countries to
normal working balances.
3; Multilateral asset settlement
Even before the convertibility of the US dollar was
suspended, the existing system was clearly deficient in
various respects. The primary reserves of reserve centres
did not systematically change in response to balance of
payments deficits or surpluses, since other countries could
and did settle their collective surpluses or deficits
viz-a-viz  the reserve centre by adding to or drawing upon
their holdings of currency reserves. For the same reason
global reserves could increase or decrease, not as a result
of an international decision, but as the unplanned
consequence of deficits or surpluses of the reserve centres
and of the uncoordinated decisions by other countries to
accumulate surpluses in the form of reserve currencies or
to change the composition of their reserves in favour of
currency reserves.
Asset settlement  aims to correct these shortcomings of the
existing system by requiring that reserve centres settle.
their balance of payments deficits in primary reserve
assets, while it should also ensure that reserve centres
receive primary assets when they are in surplus.
Interpreted in this sense, asset settlement clearly satisfy
the objectives (a) and (b) of the reformed system.No C 123/20 Official Journal of the European Communities 14. 10. 74
There are two possible ways in which asset settlement
could be organized. One would be to impose the
obligation on all, members of the system to bilaterally
convert any newly received currency reserves into
primary assets at the country of issue. The ather
possibility is a system of multilateral asset settlement via
special settlement account in the Fund its major
feature being that reserve centres would undertake to sell
primary assets to the Fund, or to buy primary assets from
the Fund whenever they are in deficit or in surplus.
Under the latter system, settlement is no longer a
bilateral transaction, but is defined in terms of rights and
obligations of reserve centres  viz-a-viz  the Fund on the
one hand, and of rights and obligations of non-reserve
centres  viz-a-viz  the Fund on the other hand. These two
aspects of multilateral asset settlement will be taken up
separately in the next sections.
We support the idea of  multilateral asset settlement. 
avoids the political and economic tensions inherent in the
alternative system, that of obligatory bilateral conversion.
Multilateral asset settlement also circumvents the difficult
problem of distinguishing between 'aid' and 'new
reserve currency balances, a problem that does arise
under a system of obligatory bilateral conversion. If it is
correctly defined and applied multilateral asset
settlement would indeed (a) cause the balance af
payments position of the reserve centres to be reflected in
changes of their primary assets and (b) prevent any
unplanned increase in global reserves due to deficits of
reserve centres.
Multilateral asset settlement would not, in itself, satisfy
objective (c). It is necessary, therefore, to take special
precautions against destabilizing shifts in the composition
of reserves in particular by preventing the emergence of
new reserve currenCIes.
4. Rights and obligations af reserve centres
Under multilateral asset settlement, a reserVe centre
would have the right to buy primary assets fram the
Fund when it has a balance of payments surplus, but
only to the extent that the surplus is not already reflected
in a rise in its primary reserves (resulting from ather
countries having settled their deficits with the reserve
centre in primary assets).
Conversely, a reserve centre wauld have the obligation to
sell primary assets to the Fund when it has a balance of
payments deficit, but again anly to the extent that the
deficit is not already reflected in a fall of its primary
reserves (1). In both cases, the indicated restriction must
be made in order to allow for voluntary bilateral
settlement in primary reserve assets, which cannot and
need not be prohibited under a system of multilateral
asset settlement. The major advantage of multilateral
) These rules could, of course, be modified so as to deal with the
special problems of the interim-period. In particular, the obligations
of the reserve centres could be temporarily reduced durinp; the
interim-period. Since this paper concentrates on the reform of the
system we shall not work out these ideas concerning the interim-
period at this point.
asset settlement to the reserve centre is, however, that it
cannot be confronted with demands far canversian
resulting from past deficits: bilateral asset settlement by
the reserve centre would be purely voluntary.
The choice of the specific settlement criterion (i.e. the
definition af  reserve centre s balance of payment
surplus or deficit) is of considerable importance. It is far
more than a simple matter af definition, since it
determines the essential characteristics af the whole
system.
In the context of reserve creatian, the logical definitian
of a reserve centre s deficit of surplus is that based 
the  official settlements balance.  Multilateral asset
settlement based on this definition implies that any
increase of a reserve centre s liquid liabilities to foreign
monetary authorities is to be settled in primary assets via
the Fund. This rule would satisfy our second objective as
well as the first, since global reserves could no longer
grow as the result af countries accumulating currency
reserves: any such accumulation af currency reserves
would be fully offset by a loss of primary reserves on the
part of the reserve centre via the mechanism 
multilateral asset settlement (2
Although multilateral asset settlement based an the
official settlements balance provides a logically
acceptable system, it has certain economic and practical
drawbacks. Its economic drawbacks are that asset
settlement by the reserve centre may be delayed
whenever it incurs liquid liabilities not  to' fareign
monetary authorities but to non-official foreign holders
(in practice: to foreign private banks).
As a result, a reserve centre may be forced to' yield
primary assets to' the Fund at a later stage, not because
of any fundamental factor relevant to the ecanamic
situation then prevailing, but because previausly incurred
liquid liabilities to non-official holders are converted into
official reserves. 
In order to eliminate this potential instability in the
system, multilateral asset settlement could conceivably be
based on the  liquidity balance  af the reserve centres
which includes changes in liquid liabilities not only to
foreign monetary authorities, but to all foreign halders.
However, it is difficult to see how such a system cauld
work in practice, since non-official holdings af reserve
currencies are not reserves, cannot be used in balance 
payments settlement and cannot be subject to
designation by the Fund.
Whereas we cannot in practice utilize the econamically
more relevant concept of the liquidity balance in the
system of multilateral asset settlement it, rather than the
official settlements balance, should play- a role in the
adjustment pmcess. Since they are relieved of asset
) Except for placements in the Eurocurrency market. On this point
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settlement for their non~official liquid liabilities, the
reserve centres have a special responsibility in this area
particularly in determining their internal policy mix such as to gear !llonetary policy more to external
considerations. It is clear that other countries will alsO'
have to make a contribution in coordinating monetary
policies with a view to preventing interest rate differentials
from producing an excessive growth of non-official
. holdings of reserve currencies.
5. Rights and obligations of other countries
We believe that the proposals made in the previous
section, dealing with the relationship. between the reserve
centres and the Fund, satisfy the first two objectives of
the reform except in one important respect, namely the
transformation of liabilities to' afficial holders intO'
private claims an the reserve centres via the Eurocurrency
market. Official placements in the Eurocurrency market
lead to an unplanned increase in global reserves to the
extent that the claims on the reserve centres that are
placed in the Eurocurrency market are acquired by other
official holders. This loophole in the system shauld be
closed by appropriate measures to contain the placement
of official reserves in the Eurocurrency market.
Apart from this last problem, the first twO' objectives 
the reform are satisfied by the proposals contained in the
previous section. They dO' not , however contribute
necessarily to the attainment of the third objective, that
of reducing the role of reserve currencies in the interest
of stability. Obviously, this shauld apply to' all reserve
currencies, the traditional ones as well as others.
Currency reserves increase when reserve centres run a
balance of payments deficit to the extent that it 
financed by increasing liquid liabilities. Under the system
of multilateral asset settlement, the additional reserve
currency holdings are not converted bilaterally into
primary reserve assets except to the extent that the
reserve centre is willing to do sa on a valuntary basis.. In
general, asset settlement will take place via the Fund, the
reserve centre selling primary reserve to' the Fund in the
amount af its deficit.
In order to obtain the reserve currencies which the Fund
requires to pay for the primary assets, one possible
method is the designation procedure. This would lead to
substitutian of SDRs for the newly created reserve
currency balances and would fully serve the abjective af
preventing a renewed build-up  af  currency reserves (1
The designation procedure could obviously be frustrated
if countries could freely rebuild their reserve currency
balances by using SDR. Consequently, balance af
payments need should in principle be maintained as a
criterion for the use of SDR, unless other means are
found to make countries accept a limitatian on reserve
currency holdings.
(1) Since not all countries participate in the SDR system, problems
could arise with the designation procedure when important sur-
pluses accrue to non-participating countries.  This  problem will
have to be seriously examined.
The rules of designation in a system of multilateral asset
settlement would have to be warked out. A possible rule
would be either to harmonize the compositian of reserves
or to designate in relation to newly acquired reserve
currency holdings. It would also be possible to use the
designation procedure only to the extent that voluntary
transactions are not sufficient.
In order to be acceptable, designation should be made as
little a burden as possible on the participating countries
by making SDR holdings attractive relatively to reserve
currency holdings. This would also serve to reduce the
effective infringement on natianal freedam in the
composition of official reserves. The position of the SDR
should in any case be strengthened by raising the rate of
interest on SDR, but it would obviously be impracticable
as well as undesirable to make the rate at all times fully
competitive with money market rates in the major reserve
centres. The appropriate rate  of  interest on SDR haldings
should be considered in relation to the provisions
concerning its value and any passible disincentives to be
introduced for holdings of reserve currencies.
While designation is entirely appropriate in the case af
reserve centre deficits, the same does not hold for
surpluses,  at least until reserve currency holdings have
been reduced to the level of normal working balances.
When a reserve centre runs a surplus, it is entitled to' buy
SDR from the Fund. Given the objective to' reduce the
amount of reserve currency holdings in the system, it
would be quite inappropriate to' force the reserve
currency which the Fund acquires onto the other
participants of the system by a pracess  af  reverse
designation
Instead, the Fund should fund these balances with the
reserve centre. The debt thus incurred by the reserve
centre should carry a SDR-exchange guarantee, since the
asset settlement transaction implies that the reserve
centre receives SDR-denominated liabilities.
6. M?bile capital flows
To the extent that mobile capitals flows are destabilizing,
they are undesirable as such and shauld be prevented.
The methods to achieve this are the subject of separate
deliberations and will therefare not be cansidered in this
paper. We shall deal only with the consequences of such
flows, given that they accur, on the system of multilateral
asset settlement.
It has been suggested that the system of multilateral asset
settlement should be relaxed in the case of destabilizing
capital outflows from a reserve centre since full
settlement would impose to'o much  af  a burden on the
reserve centre and too much of a stress on the system as
whole. There is no daubt that the system should
provide sufficient elasticity to deal with such cases. Such
provisions already exist in the farm af the 'General
Agreement to Barrow , swap arrangements between
central banks, etc. If necessary, these arrangements cauld
be expanded. But it is not desirable that the general
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relaxed (except in so far as this is implied by the swap
arrangements), or that this should be done exclusively for
the benefit of reserve centres. It could easily become an
important loophole in the system, since destabilizing
capital flows are notoriously difficult to indentify with
any degree of objective precision.
REPORT OF THE WORKING PARTY ON SECURITIES MARKETS
ANNEX 
During the period under review (fourth quarter 1972 to
end 1973), the capital market trends in most Community
countries were affected by a monetary policy which
because of the persistent inflationary tendencies, was
given an increasingly restrictive bias, although there were
notable exceptions. Action on interest rates played an
important part among the means employed. This was
facilitated by the attenuation of external constraints, due
particularly to the joint floating of the principal
Community currencies. The successive raising of official
discount rates, which in most countries were standing at
record levels at the end of the year, together with the
measures t0' restrict bank liquidity led  to a sharp rise in
short-term interest rates, with money market rates 
except in Luxembourg and Italy  following suit with a
certain time lag to differing degrees. From October
1972 to the end of 1973 interest rates, measured by the
stock market yield on public bonds, rose by less than
0.5 % in Italy and less than 1 % in Luxembourg and
Belgium; in Germany, France and the Netherlands, the
yield increased by between 1.4 and 1.9 0/0, while 
Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom it rose by as
much as 2,3 to 3 0/0.
The rise in interest rates was generally speaking,
continuous, the peaks being reached at the end of 1973.
A notable exception was Germany, where the high point
for the period was reached in July. As a result of these
rises, interest rate differentials between the Community
countries widened considerably. The gap between the
highest rate and the lowest rate in tne Community, which
had been less than 3 % at the beginning of the period
reached 5,5 % at the end of the year. This was possible
only because the majority of the member countries kept
their markets isolated from each other and, in order to
ensure sufficient room for manoeuvre for their monetary
policy, even accentuated the division. In February 1973
for instance the German authorities instituted an
authorization procedure for the acquisition of domestic
bonds by non-residents which was strictly enforced.
The trend in the volume of issues differed quite sharply
from one member country to another. In France, Italy
and Denmark the performance was distinctly better than
in 1972. In Belgium the volume of issues was slightly up
on the previous year, while the German capital market
proved somewhat less receptive than in 1972 when
admittedly the result had been exceptionally good. On the
other hand the volume of issues was well down on the
previous year s results in the United Kingdom and the
Netherlands.
In virtually all the countries, howeverr this overall trend
masks sharp variations in new issue activity during the
year. In Denmark and the United Kingdom, for instance
the amount of capital raised in the first half of the year
was so large that it more than offset the poor result for
the subsequent period (Denmark) or limited the negative
results for the year as a whole. In France, Italy and
Germany highly productive periods alternated with times
of market saturation. Towards the end of 1973 the
German, French, United Kingdom and Danish markets in
particular were proving to be insufficiently absorptive.
Borrowers and the monetary authorities reacted in
different ways to market strains. Some countries insured
market equilibrium in such situations by interrupting
issues or spreading them over a longer period and/or
adjusting interest rates. In Italy, on the other hand, where
for economic policy reasons an increase in long-term
interest rates was regarded as undesirable, the Banca
Italia at times purchased large quantities of securities.
The securities portfolio of the Issue Department of the
Bank of England also increased appreciably at times.
Coordination of capital market policies was not achieved
during this period; dissimilarities in the economic
situations of member countries caused different objectives
to be attributed to national economic policies. In
addition, different views continue to be held on the role
of interest rate policy.
The balance of payments position of the various
members exhibited very different trends throughout the
period: sharp deterioration for some, distinct or even
significant improvement for others. Because of this
deficit countries were forced to take measures to control
capital exports to avoid an eventual reduction in their
external balance, while the surplus countries took various
measures restricting capital imports and/or encouraging
capital exports to prevent inflows of capital which would
counteract their monetary policy. Together these
measures constitute a set-back to progress in the
liberalization of capital movements.
The share markets in all the countries were affected 
especially in the second half of the year  by anti-
inflation measures, and at the end of the period, by
uncertainty as to the effects of the energy crisis on the
pattern of firms' costs and on future economic growth.
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exchanges without exception were down, and in some
cases considerably so, on the level at the beginning of the
period under review.
In  Germany  the major feature has been the effect on the
capital markets of the credit policy of the central bank.
Over the year as a whole, the volume of issues was fairly
high, although there was a slight fall from the volume of
1972 which had, however, been an exceptional year. As
in previous years, purchases by the non-bank sector, and
especially households contributed much to this
satisfactory result concerning the volume.
The fall in the volume of issues in the fourth quarter of
1972 was attributed to the effectiveness of the restrictive
monetary policy, and expectations of a further rise in
interest rates.
There was a further decline in issues in the second
quarter of 1973 after a very high volume in the first
quarter, and this was accompanied by a steady rise in
yields until July, as issuers made concessions to
subscribers in order to ensure placing. At the same time
further conjunctural measures taken by the authorities in
the second quarter of 1973 to restrain inflation pushed
nominal interest rates up to the record level of 10 0/0, and
yields to more than 10 %. As this high level of interest
again attracted investors to the bond market, and in
order to keep the rates high as a measure to counter
inflation, the authorities encouraged a high volume of
issues. Towards the end of the third quarter, however
the cyclical demand for capital had fallen sufficiently to
permit interest rates and yields to decline slightly to
about 9'5 0/0.
There was a distinct decline in the volume of foreign
issues in DM after the second quarter, and the total
volume was some 20 to 25  inferior to that of the
previous year (DM 2200 million in 1973 compared to DM
716 million in 1972).
As in previous years, the totality of foreign issues was
~'ubscribed to by non-residents, there being no net
exports of long-term capital. In addition, the government
reinforced and extended existing measures preventing
fore:gners from buying German securities. Yields on
international DM bonds issued by non-residents were
stable at around 7010 until mid-year when they were
about 3 % below the level of internal issues. Subsequently
they moved gradually and, by the end of the year
sharply, upwards to attain a level superior to the yield of
domestic bonds.
The share market had a bad year. Weakened at the end
of 1972 after Bundestag elections, it recovered at the
beginning of the year to resist the monetary disturbances
of March 1973 only to become pessimistic again in July.
The volume of issues over the year as a whole did not
show a very large fall, being about DM 2 000 million in
1973 compared to DM 2400 million in 1972. But the
share price index (end 1965 = 100) which had been 149
at the end of 1972 and rose to 168 in March, had fallen
to 123 by December 1973.
On the  French  securities markets, the volume of gross
issues was greater in 1973 than in 1972 by 35 0/0, private
enterprises and financial institutions again being the
principal borrowers on this market. During the first
quarter the market was uneven, due to the issue of a State
loan and a certain saturation of the market. Measures
were taken by the authorities to combat this, however, by
making smaller issues less often and increasing interest
rates and yields, and the volume of issues reached a
record level in the first six months. Later in the year
there was a certain slowdown in the volume of issues, in
the third quarter, compared with the corresponding
quarter of 1972, followed by a strong recovery in
October and November before the market once again
showed signs of saturation in December.
Much of the evolution in the bond market can be
illustrated by the movement of yields. At the beginning of
1973 yields of around 8,35 0/0 had appeared sufficiently
attractive, particularly to institutional investors. There
was a large increase to about 9 Ofo in mid-year which was
the price of an increase in issues. In the third quarter,
however, there was a further rise in yields, despite the
slow-down in the volume of issues. In December, yields
rose even further to end the year at over 9.750/0.
In addition to the bond market, private enterprises also
increased their use of the share market as a source of
funds this year. Share issues increased in every quarter
producing a global expansion of 20 Ofo over 1972. The
share price index rose steadily up to April 1973 but by
the end of the year had declined to about five points
below the level at the beginning of the year. Fears of a
sharp slowdown in the growth rate and difficulties in
financing due to the oil crisis were apparently the
strongest factors in this evolution, as was the case in
most other countries.
The combination of a large balance of payments deficit, a
rapid rise in consumer prices and a recovery of industrial
production caused the  Italian  authorities to take a series
of restrictive measures in mid-1973, in contrast to the
previous expansionist policy. These aimed to establish
selective credit controls, make short-term credits more
expensive, to reduce capital inflows notably by means of
introducing a non-interest bearing deposit of  50010 
purchases of foreign securities by residents, and to oblige
the banks to invest more and more on the bond markets,
thus providing direct and indirect influence on the capital
markets.
Issues were distinctly greater in 1973 than in the previous
year. In the first and second quarters of 1973, issues of
domestic bonds were slightly lower than in 1972 due to
reluctance by investors, but issues on the international
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the Banca d'Italia. In the third and fourth quarters of
1973 there was a sharp increase both in domestic issues
and Euro-issues. Gross domestic issues were Lit 8874000
million in 1973 compared with Lit 5 879 000 million in
1972, and Euro-issues were Lit 1 900 000 million in 1973
compared with Lit 448 000 million in 1972.
Interest rates remained stable at around 7  and yields
at 7-5 % as a result of government policy to encourage
investment and to increase industrial production. The
authorities, relying on measures against capital outflows
(see above), succeeded in keeping interest rates at such a
low level compared with conditions abroad, thus virtually
separating the Italian bond market from the rest of the
world.
At the end of 1972 and the beginning of 1973 there was
an increase in the volume of share issues, and this level
was maintained in the rest of the period, an increasing
part of the capital going to companies quoted on the
official market.
Share prices steadily increased until mid-1973 
industrial production and business profits recovered. It
was also felt that equities would provide a hedge against
inflation. However, in the third and fourth quarters of
1973, these hopes were disappointed and stock market
quotations dropped as a result of a shrinking in the
volume of available credit and government anti-
inflationary policy.
At the end of 1972, the United Kingdom markets were
quiet, with over half the activity involving British
Government securities. At the beginning of 1973
however, the authorities made large net sales of stock
and sold even higher amounts in the second quarter. In
the following quarter the market was generally quiet and
official sales of stock were small. As a result of the
economic situation, the market was generally weak in the
fourth quarter, although sizeable amounts of Government
Stock were sold in October and around mid-December.
Activity in most other fixed-interest securities was more
consistent until December when the amount 
transactions was substantially smaller.
Yields on British Government securities, like those in the
parallel money markets, increased sharply in the second half
of the year from just around 10 % in June to rather more
than 11 % in October and about 12.5 % in December.
This was mainly in response to a tightening of monetary
policy in July (when the minimum lending rate rose to
11,50/0) and again during November (when the minimum
lending rate rose to 13  and there was a call for a
further 2 % of special deposits). The yields on other
fixed-interest securities also rose sharply.
The equity market was also unsettled during the year
with domestic capital issues well below those in 1972
(138 million in 1973 compared with 680 million in 1972),
and the share price index fell by over 30 Ofo during the
course of the year, from 505 to 344, touching 306 in mid-
December just before the announcement of new
deflationary measures.
The particular characteristic of the  Irish  capital market is
its close dependence on the United Kingdom capital
market, especially in terms of interest rates. This is due
to the fact that there is freedom of movement of capital
between the two countries, the difference in the size of
the two markets, and (recently) the merging of the United
Kingdom and Irish Stock Exchanges.
Interest rates followed closely those in the United
Kingdom partly through market forces and partly
through action by the authorities to avoid large capital
outflows. There was a sharp rise at the beginning of
1973, and short-term money rates reached a peak under
the influence of the parallel money markets in the United
Kingdom towards the end of the year. Yields on
government securities followed the same pattern, reaching
an historical high level of 10 % in February 1973, easing
off in mid-year to reach a new high of 12.5 % 
December.
There was a rise in issues in the second quarter of 1973
so that banks could maintain their secondary liquidity
reserve ratios, and despite a fall in issues in the third
quarter, when the volume of redemptions exceeded the
volume of issues, there was a renewed demand in the
fourth quarter when nominal sales were f, 24 million
compared with f 12 million for the fourth quarter 1972;
although again this demand was mainly from the banks
and confined to shorter maturities.
A structural feature of the  Danish  capital market is that
90 % of bond issues are made by the mortgage credit
institutions. This means that the markets are most heavily
infl~nced by, and government measures concentrated on
developments in the housing sector.
The absorptive capacity of the market proved to be very
strong at the beginning of the period (fourth quarter
1972) with issues remaining at a high level of around
30 % over the corresponding period of 1971. At the
beginning of 1973, however, bond prices came under
heavy pressure as a result of a large issue of mortgage
bonds, despite some support by the national bank. In the
face of this situation, the mortgage institutions after
consultation with the authorities, imposed ceilings on
mortgage borrowings in order to restrain the rise in
demand for capital and alleviate the disparity between
investment in the housing market and investment for
industrial development. The volume of issues which had
been very high in early 1973 declined in the third and
fourth quarte'rs of 1973 to a level some 15 % above 1972,
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The distinct increase in bond prices which occurred after
the referendum of 2 October 1972 on the accession to the
EEC was followed in November by a decline which
continued until mid-March: due to this, the average yield
increased by at least 1 0/0. Following a recovery in April
which compensated for a small part of the previous
losses, there was a further sudden fall in prices in July
and August; it was only in December that a certain
stabilization manifested itself, given that prices only
decreased slightly. The average bond yield at the end of
the year reached around  13,50/0 exceeding therefore the
level of 2.5 % at the end of 1972 and that of 3.5 
at the end of November 1972. The increase in yields
was, however, smaller for certain high-interest bonds.
The share market, traditionally an unimportant source of
funds, experienced a new lease of life after Denmark'
entry into the Community. In the first half of 1973
foreign demand for Danish shares, although restricted by
quotas, was at a high level, and both issues and prices
increased, although demand and issues fell back to a
more 'normal' level in the second half of the year, when
foreign net purchases of Danish shares fell to zero, and
later suffered net repatriations. The share price index
rose up to the end of August 1973, but later fell, in line
with activity on the market, to end the year at 177
compared with 217 in August.
On the  Dutch  capital market, after a continuous decline
in the first six months, the volume of new issues
stabilized during the second half of the year at the level
of the previous year.
At the end of 1972, the increase in short-term rates had
caused a contraction of the capital market due to the
withdrawal of certain funds from this market, notably by
the banks. Furthermore the institutional investors
expecting a rise in long-term rates, preferred to wait.
During the first part of 1973, due to the development of
the exchange markets, which produced an easy money
market, borrowers preferred to hav~ recourse to this
market and obtain their financing by short-term capital.
During the second half of the year, the high level of
short-term interest rates and the continuing preference of
investors for liquidity, necessitated an upwards adjustment
in the long-term interest rate: only when yields on
privately contracted loans reached 9 % (at the beginning
of September) did the institutional investors return to the
capital market.
But this recovery was only temporary; the market
suffered a further setback as a result of the oil crisis and
by the end of the year yields were at around the level
already achieved (9.5 to 9,750/0). On the whole, activity
was quiet and the drying-up of issues which occurred
during the year clearly reflected the reluctance of
investors.
The authorities took a number of monetary policy
measures to combat inflation; they were led to increase
the rate of discount on several occasions in order 
avoid too large discrepancies in relation to the rate in
other countries. Monetary policy during the year was
moderately restrictive, principally aiming to prevent a
large increase in the liquidity of both banks and
individuals; the trend in unemployment and the relative
weakness of industrial investment prevented a more
severe policy from being implemented.
Despite liberalizing measures taken in January, (now
permitting residents to purchase by subscription 'guilder
notes' issued, by residents), the market for these notes
was quiet throughout the period. During the second half
of 1973, issues almost completely ceased, while ' yields
exceeded 10 % on the secondary market.
There were traditionally few issues of shares over the
period. The share price index rose at first from 130 at
the end of 1972 to 144 in April, then falling back to 101
in December 1973.
The volume of gross issues on the  Belgian  securities
market was slightly higher for the whole of 1973 than for
1972 (Bfrs 267000 million in 1973 compared with Bfrs
238 000 million in 1972). Borrowers had no great
difficulty in placing issues laid down in the schedule
although during the course of the year two public issues
were delayed in order to ensure an even flow of new
issues on the market.
This ease of placing was especially useful in permitting
the authorities to consolidate a part of its floating debt
and to continue the redemption of the foreign currency
debt to an amount of Bfrs 3,4 000 million.
The major characteristic of the capital market has been
the stability of the rate of interest and yields, both only
rising from 7 % to just below 8 % over the course of the
year, despite the exceptionally high level in neighbouring
countries.
The share market has been quiet; the volume of issues
was not as high as in 1972, although a record number of
new companies have requested quotations. There was a
slight increase in the share price index up to the middle
of the year, but a fall in the second half of the year to
about the level at the beginning of the year.
In the  Grand Duchy of Luxembourg,  although the level of
domestic issues was quite high at the end of 1972, it was
reduced at the beginning of 1973 and later even
suspended in order to avoid an influx of speculative
capital.
During the two last quarters, the authorities reopened the
market to borrowers willing to quickly convert and
export the product of their borrowing.
Towards the end of the year, a certain shrinking of the
market occurred, partly due to a desire to maintain a
relatively stable interest rate in relation to the very high
rates prevailing on the money market.
The total volume of issues was Lfrs 2 700 million
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The characteristics of the Lfrs 300 million State loan are
interesting: it was available only for physical persons,
bore no interest coupon and was redeemable at premium
free from income tax.
Bond yields have remained fairly stable over the whole
period, the maximum increase being of the order of
0,770/0.
In contrast to previous years continuing monetary
uncertainty in the past year had strong repercussions on
the  international markets,  where the size and composition
of the volume of issues, the distribution of issues by
borrowing countries and the interest rate trend were all
affected.
After reaching the record figure of 1 980 million EUR in
the fourth quarter of 1972, the volume of issues fell
appreciably in the first and second quarters of 1973 as a
result of the monetary events in February and March and
the drop in the dollar rate. After a further sharp dip in
the third quarter to 616 million EUR there was a strong
recovery in the final quarter, but even this quarterly
result  as all the others in 1973  was distinctly lower
than the figures for the corresponding quarter of the
previous year. This meant that between 1972 and 1973
the total volume of international issues dropped by 35 
to 4556 million EUR. This decline affected issues in all
currencies with the exception of the Swiss franc. Issues in
this currency last year did in fact slightly exceed the high
1972 figure.
A breakdown by currencies of issue shows a slight fall in
dollar issues (from 51 to 45 % of the total volume) and
an appreciable increase in the share of DM and SwF
issues (25 and 15 % in 1973 as against 20 and 10 % in
1972). The proportion of foreign DM issues in total
issues denominated in currencies other than the dollar
increased from 42 to 46 0/0, while the corresponding
figure for SwF issues rose from 19 to a good 280/0. On
the other hand there was a marked fall in international
issues denominated in guilders and French francs; issues
of these securities practically dried up in the second half
of the year.
The share of issues denominated in units of account
insignificant in 1972, considerably increased in 1973
particularly due to the new 'Eurco' formula. The Eurco
is a unit of account based on a basket of the nine
Community currencies in fixed proportions. The value
expressed in one of these nine currencies (or in any other
currency) varies every day according to fluctuations in
exchange rates and is the sum of the amounts obtained by
converting the various currencies making up the whole
into the desired currency. Two Community borrowers
used this formula in autumn 1973 for an amount of 50
million Eurco.
Privately placed loans recorded in the statistics were
again in 1973 of little significance (37 million EUR
compared to 48 million EUR in 1~72).
In contrast to the downward trend in the volume of
issues, Eurodollar bank loans shot up: in 1973 they
probably amounted to at least 24000 million, an almost
fourfold increase over 1972. This suggests that the sharp
drop in the volume of issues was not due to a shortage
of funds on the markets, but to the reluctance of issuers
and investors to contract long-term debts in the present
circumstances. Therefore, Euro-Ioans, which enable more
capital to be raised at a time than bond issues, were
favoured by borrowers.
There were also considerable shifts last year in the
pattern of countries floating loans: while the EEC share
jumped from 27 to 45 0J0 (increase of 1973 on 1972), the
US share dropped appreciably, from some 25 % in 1972
to less than 19 0/0.
Interest rates on the international capital market were
particularly affected by the events on the foreign
exchange markets. A slight drop in interest rates on
dollar issues in the closing months of 1972 could be
taken as a sign of renewed confidence in the dollar. One
main consequence was that the gap between interest rates
on the dollar issues market and some Euro-currency
markets narrowed. But bouts of speculation in February
and March and the heavy pressure on the dollar in the
following months then led to a sharp increase in interest
rates on dollar issues, although the volume of these issues
was constantly declining; the peak was reached in July
when the stock market yield was 9.25 0/0. Although the
yield had fallen back to 8.75 % by the end of 1973,
compared to the beginning of the period under review
this represented an increase of more than 1.5 % in the
real interest rate.
There was an even more substantial advance in the
interest rates on foreign DM issues. After yields had
fallen from 7.25 % in the final quarter of 1972 to 6.75 %
at the beginning of March, a steady upward movement
set in. With the German mark weakening on the foreign
exchange markets the prices of foreign DM issues came
under increasing pressure from October onwards, with
the result that yields on these issues caught up with the
yields on domestic issues by the end of November and a
month later were almost 0,5 % higher. Over the entire
period under review the yield on foreign DM issues
increased by some 3 %.
The Swiss franc was the only major currency of issue to
remain relatively unaffected by the rise in international
interest rates. The yield at issue was mainly between 6
and 6,5 % throughout the period. As the yields on SwF
bonds were already the lowest of all international issues,
the gap between them and yields on issues in. other
currencies widened distinctly.14. 10. 74 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 123/27
There were no major changes last year in the policies
pursued by the monetary authorities of the member
countries. The German authorities did, however, get the
issuing banks to limit the volume of international DM
loans  not counting the issues of international
organizations  to DM 400 million to DM 500 million per
month. In addition agreements were concluded on a time
limit for the conversion and transfer of the proceeds of
issues. The banks further entered into a gentleman
agreement not to sell foreign DM issues from their
holdings to non-residents.
In the Netherlands residents were authorized to
subscribe to international guilder issues where the issuer
was also a resident.
kind of 'cash deposit' on exports of capital
introduced by the Italian authorities in July 1973 meant
that Italian subscribers withdrew almost completely from
the international markets, except for loans floated by
European institutions which could still be purchased on
both the primary market and the secondary market
without the cash deposit having to be made. At the same
time for balance of payments reasons, greater
encouragement was given for importing capital, especially
in the form of borrowing on international capital
markets, by enterprises and financial institutions. The
resulting net inflow of capital amounted to some $ 4000
million in 1973.
In addition to the regular examination of trends on the
national and international capital markets the working
party began to look into how cooperation between the.
capital market authorities of the Member States could be
stepped up. The working party takes the view that this
work is in line with the provision of the Council
resolution of 22 March 1971 requiring a procedure to be
laid down for the progressive coordination of the
Member States' policies with  regard to capital markets.
The discussions, which are still continuing, are on the
possibilities of identifying the short-term objectives of
capital market policy and the plans for structural reform
essential to the capital market. From now on the working
party has agreed in principle to exchange information on
all measures which affect the capital market.
In addition, the working party started to look at the
problems connected with protecting holders of fixed-
interest securities from the fall in the value of money.
The starting point for the discussions is the sharp and
persistent rise in prices in virtually all member countries.
Erosion of the value of money on such a scale could
discourage saving through investment in bonds and be
prejudicial to the efficiency of the bond market. The
working party has studied several solutions, among
others, which would compensate for losses sustained by
savers and preserve the important source of finance for
the private and public ' sectors, which the bond market
represents: index-linking, higher interest rates, shorter
periods of maturity and tax measures. This analysis gave
special consideration to the fact that applying them in an
uncoordinated manner could hamper efforts to merge the
national markets into a European capital market. The
working party hopes to conclude the study in the near
future and to put the results before the Monetary
Committee.
In conclusion, it may be noted that at a special meeting
the working party examined the structure of the British
capital market. Its studies of capital market structures
will shortly be completed with an examination of the
Irish and Danish markets.
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e. O'Carra, Department of Finance, Dublin.
M. Coffey, Central Bank of Ireland, Dublin.
Dott. B. Bianchi, Servizio studi, Banca d'Italia, Rome.
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banques, Luxembourg.
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Commission of the European Communities, Brussels (until 30 June
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